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In DRC v FG Hemisphere both the majority and minority opinions in the 
Court of Final Appeal treated international law as irrelevant for the decision 
which was supposed to be taken on the basis of constitutional principle alone. 
This was a mistaken course with potentially very negative consequences for the 
rule of law in Hong Kong. The minority treated decisions taken on sovereign 
immunity by HK courts in the past as frozen into precedents in common law 
and therefore deriving their strength only from the common law of Hong Kong. 
On the other hand the majority effectively decided that any issue coming before 
it which involves international law is automatically a matter of foreign affairs 
and that it is up to the PRC to tell the HK courts what is the interpretation 
of international law. The article argues that in future HK courts should treat 
the law of sovereign immunity as sui generis having no implications for their 
approach to other international law questions.
Introduction
The facts of the DRC v FG Hemisphere1 are very well known. Here it is 
not necessary to reiterate them. The essential point is that the PRC is 
engaged in massive development cooperation with the DRC, through 
the instrumentality of its state owned enterprises (SOE) and banks, some 
of which have a seat in Hong Kong. FG Hemisphere wished to recover 
a previous bad debt of the DRC through entry fees that the PRC’s SOEs 
in Hong Kong are due to pay the DRC. The PRC argues, through the 
Secretary of Justice as intervener, that it is its view of international law 
that sovereign immunity is absolute and that this rule should apply to 
HK Courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. The PRC, especially in its 3rd letter 
to the Court, also argues that sovereign immunity and its transactions 
with the DRC are clearly matters of foreign affairs which fall outside the 
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competence of the HKSAR. It argues that in matters of foreign affairs, 
such as the state policy on sovereign immunity, it is essential that the 
HKSAR and the PRC speak with one voice.
These arguments appear to mingle together inextricably international 
law and domestic constitutional law questions. It is nowhere explicitly 
stated by the PRC in its letters, that it alone decides the content of inter-
national law that applies to the PRC. However, it could be argued that, 
in the view of the PRC, it is a particularity of this aspect of international 
law that each state applies it in its own courts as it judges its state policy 
to require. Then the question arises, what is the status of the interna-
tional law doctrine of restrictive immunity as it has applied through the 
common law, in Hong Kong. It could be said that Hong Kong, before 
the handover, simply had applied to it the decisions which the United 
Kingdom applied, also as a matter of state policy, with respect to sover-
eign immunity in its national courts. The failure to keep on the UK Sov-
ereign Immunity ordinance after 1997 might indicate the intention that 
PRC state policy was to be adopted in Hong Kong. This is a matter of 
interpretation of all aspects of the Basic Law, including the legal arrange-
ments accompanying the Handover in June 1997. 
International law is a general system of law which is equally binding 
on all states. In other words, it is not a matter of individual state legal 
policy how international law is understood. Particularly, customary inter-
national law binds all states, even those which have not expressly con-
sented to it. Through persistent objection it might appear that an indi-
vidual state may opt out of an evolving rule of customary international 
law. However, the possibility of persistent objection is disputed and, in 
any case, it is contested in this case, whether the PRC is effectively a 
persistent objector. As for the position of the United Kingdom it would 
be tendentious to say that the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity 
is its state policy. In other words, the common law of Hong Kong itself 
refl ected at, and after the Handover, what was regarded as the interna-
tional law doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity. It would be bet-
ter to say that the United Kingdom and its former colony, under the 
One Country, Two Systems rule, are observing the fairly recently evolved 
international customary law rule on restrictive sovereign immunity. I am 
aware that all of these points, as a matter of international law, can be a 
matter of debate and have been in the High Court and in the Court of 
Appeal in this case. 
However, it is a remarkable fact that both the majority and the minor-
ity opinions in this case keep a fi rm distance from international law and 
purport to treat the entire legal issue of sovereign immunity as a matter 
of what the judges call “municipal law and constitutional principle”. The 
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case note explores how all of the judges do this. It speculates a little as 
to why they do so, but above all, it expresses concern about the conse-
quent apparent abdication of international law issues by the HK Courts 
in favour of the PRC, ostensibly on the ground that it is a matter of 
foreign policy for the PRC to determine the content of international law. 
It is recommended that it would have been better for the rule of law in 
international society – a society of which Hong Kong in economic mat-
ters is a very signifi cant part – for the majority to have determined that 
either the law of sovereign immunity was absolute under international 
law, the same view as that of the PRC, or that even under the doctrine of 
restrictive immunity, the relations of the PRC and its SOEs in the DRC 
had an entirely sovereign character, normally outside the jurisdiction of 
national courts. This would have preserved more clearly the competence 
of the HK courts to interpret effectively all of those rules of international 
law which touch upon the external aspects of the economic and social 
relations which normally come within its jurisdiction under the Basic 
Law. Instead, the Court of Final Appeal appears to have left a great deal 
of confusion around the relationship of international law and constitu-
tional law in both the PRC and in the HKSAR, and very much to the 
disadvantage of international law.
The Side–Lining of International Law in all of the Judicial Opinions
The majority opinion claims (para 411) to reject the relevance of inter-
national law to the case, whether it requires the rule of absolute or 
restrictive immunity and whether the PRC could be an effective persis-
tent objector. It goes on to say that it is not necessary to consider this 
question because “we have provisionally reached the conclusion that, as 
a matter of municipal law and constitutional principle, the doctrine of 
state immunity applicable in the HKSAR is one of absolute immunity”. 
This is a clear statement by the Court of Final Appeal that there is an 
absolute distance between international law and what it calls “municipal 
law and constitutional principle”. 
The position of the dissenting Justice Bokhary is identical. When 
faced with arguments for and against the change in the rule of custom-
ary international law on state immunity from absolute to restrictive, he 
notes the agreement of Lord Pannick, for FG Hemisphere, at para 120, 
“… holding that the immunity available in the courts of Hong Kong is 
restrictive does not require a general pronouncement by the Court that 
restrictive immunity is a rule of customary international law…”. As Lord 
Pannick puts it, the common law has had its debate on this in Hong Kong 
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and the doctrine of restrictive immunity has won. So Justice Bohkary 
concludes in para 121 that it is not necessary for him to decide whether 
restrictive immunity is a rule of customary international law. “Nor is it 
necessary for me to decide whether persistent objection works”. In other 
words, the case appears to have been predominantly argued and entirely 
decided in terms of what is supposed to be the constitutional position in 
Hong Kong and the PRC. The confrontation between the majority and 
the minority, including Justice Mortimer, could not be more severe. The 
minority argue that the HK constitutional settlement is one country – 
two systems, and that the common law is part of the two systems. The 
common law has a doctrine of restrictive immunity. The minority do 
not engage in a detailed investigation of the meaning of the doctrine of 
restrictive immunity, how it might work in practice at present in interna-
tional society, and, especially, do not engage in a discussion of the merits 
of the doctrine in the particular facts of the case.
The True Doctrine of the Incorporation of Customary International 
Law into the Common Law
In our Hong Kong Lawyer article (March 2011)2 Oliver Jones and I argue 
that the position of the Court of Appeal in this case, effectively now that 
of Lord Pannick and Justice Bohkary, is wrong. The task of English judges 
is to ascertain the current state of Customary International Law as foren-
sically as possible, instead of trying to develop or advance Customary 
International Law, which is the role of the international community, 
including the Executive (Jones v Ministry of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270 (Jones), 298; J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v 
Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 513). The same would 
surely be true of courts in Hong Kong.
In other words, it is not simply a matter of treating previous com-
mon law courts’ decisions as freezing international law into binding prec-
edents at a particular point in time. As we see it, the upshot is that no 
previous incorporation of Customary International Law is decisive. The 
Courts are not simply following the common law, but ascertaining the 
continuing development of principles of international law. The ques-
tion should not be limited to: “what has the common law of Hong Kong 
previously incorporated as Customary International Law?” Instead, it 
must always be “what does Customary International Law currently pro-
2 Tony Carty and Oliver Jones, “The Congo Case” Hong Kong Lawyer, Mar 2011 43–50, at 
44–45.
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vide”? It requires the courts to resist common law behaviours of apply-
ing precedent, but more importantly for the present constitutional con-
fl ict, it means that the Courts are not just applying the common law of 
Hong Kong at the time of the handover – which may or may not be, or 
have to be, compatible with the constitution of a unitary state. They are 
applying a universally accepted international law standard. We noted 
that Stock V-P, with whom Yuen JA agreed on this point, made a ten-
tative fi nding that “the generality of States do subscribe to [restrictive 
immunity] (para 76)”, but the choice of both judges, and in this case 
also Justice Bohkary (para 123), to base their decision on the state of 
the common law as at the handover (para 118–122, 258–267), leaves 
them open to the constitutional law argument that a unitary state should 
follow a single national law on sovereign immunity. It would have been 
much more diffi cult for such a constitutional law argument to be made in 
the face of a determination by the Court of Appeal, and by the dissent-
ing Justices Bohkary and Mortimer, that international law required the 
acceptance of the doctrine of restrictive immunity. 
The Determination of the Content of a Rule of International Law is 
not an Act of State, but a Matter for Judicial Interpretation
The majority argues that Hong Kong and China have to speak with one 
voice in foreign affairs, that a sovereign immunity law is part of foreign 
affairs, and that since the PRC has a view of sovereign immunity as abso-
lute this must be the law of Hong Kong as well. As noted, the majority 
decide the case solely as a matter of what it calls “municipal law and 
constitutional principle”. It gives no consideration at all to the idea of 
international law. 
A closer examination of exactly what the majority opinion involves 
is necessary to understand how they see the relationship of international 
law on sovereign immunity to the Basic Law. 
The fi rst point is that they regard international law itself as automati-
cally a matter of the foreign policy of a state. They state categorically at 
para 247: 
“Accordingly, where constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
affairs is allotted to the executive, and where the courts accept a “one voice” 
principle, there is no reason to exclude that approach in relation to the exec-
utive’s policy regarding the recognition or non-recognition of a commercial 
exception to absolute state immunity”.
The majority repeat this idea many times. So, they say (para 265), that 
“it is plain that the conferring and withholding of state immunity is a 
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matter which concerns relations between states, forming an important 
part of the conduct of a nation’s affairs in relations with other States”. 
It is important to see that the majority are confronting what they see 
as a constitutional principle, whether the HKSAR can espouse a dif-
ferent state immunity doctrine (para 293). These are also the terms in 
which Justice Bohkary sees the matter. The two systems element of one 
country – two systems, applying to HKSAR-PRC relations, allows the 
HKSAR to continue to adhere to what he sees as the common law prin-
ciple of restrictive immunity as its part of the two systems (para 123). 
This is opposed by the majority to the view expressed in the 3rd Letter 
from the OCMFA, identifying “the prejudice to the sovereignty of the 
Chinese State which would result if the HKSAR courts were to pur-
port to promulgate a divergent state immunity doctrine” (para 294). 
These statements in the just mentioned letter are what the majority call 
“facts of state”, quoting FA, Mann to mean “facts, circumstances and 
events which lie at the root of foreign affairs and their conduct by the 
Executive” (para 295). 
The conclusion follows for the majority that the act whereby the 
CPG determines the policy of state immunity applicable to the HKSAR 
is an act of state coming within the concept of “acts of state such as 
defense and foreign affairs” in Art 19(3). This is because “It involves 
the CPG’s determination of the PRC’s policy in its dealings with foreign 
States with regard to state immunity” (para 352). The majority then pro-
ceed to treat the letters from the OCMFA, established under Art 13(2) 
of the Basic Law as having the status of declarations of facts of state, 
which the HKSAR courts “ accept as authoritative statements of facts 
within the peculiar cognizance of the executive organ of the government 
having charge of a nation’s foreign policy” (para 363). The questions of 
fact are the PRC’s determination of the fact that the doctrine adopted 
by the PRC is a doctrine of absolute immunity and that “the adoption of 
a divergent position of the HKSAR courts would prejudice China’s sov-
ereignty and hamper its conduct of foreign affairs…” (para 361). As for 
asking for a certifi cate from the Chief Executive, there is no need for him 
“to be troubled even where the relevant facts have been authoritatively 
established and are not in dispute” (ibid.). Just to reiterate, the majority 
is referring to “the undisputed and authoritative facts of state declared in 
the OCMFA Letters, without need for a certifi cate” (para 363). 
Jones and I argued again in our Hong Kong Lawyer article,3 that the 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong be asked merely to characterise the facts 
3 Ibid., 46–48.
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of the DR Congo’s and China’s activities in the Congo as either com-
mercial or sovereign under Art 19(3). By this we meant, not whether 
the original loans incurred by the DRC in the 1980s were commercial, or 
whether the use to which the DRC would put the entry fees given to it 
by Chinese companies was commercial, but whether all of the facts of the 
transactions taken together would impact on the foreign policy goals of 
the PRC if they were adjudicated in the HKSAR Courts. That appeared 
to us as a situation for which it could be the goal of the safety-catch of 
Art 19(3) to provide. On the facts, we argued, the activities are most 
likely sovereign in the sense that China is implicated at the highest level 
in these activities, in order to achieve a range of social and political as 
well as economic goals. 
From the statements in para 5 of the OCMFA 3rd Letter, we know 
what the answer would be to such a request under Art 19(3). The letter 
says categorically that supporting the economic development of devel-
oping states is one of the foreign policies of China. Foreign companies 
acquiring developing country debts, at knockdown prices and then claim-
ing the full original value through judicial proceedings, hampers efforts 
to assist these developing countries. “Such practice is inequitable … If 
the HKSAR … facilitate the pursuance of the above-mentioned prac-
tice, it would be contradictory to the above-mentioned foreign policy of 
China and tarnish the international image of China”. The OCMFA let-
ter is in this respect an entirely commendable judgment of fact. It treats 
the practices of FH Hemisphere as damaging to the welfare of the Congo, 
frustrating to the PRC’s desire to help it develop and damaging to the 
reputation of the PRC, which would have a reputation for harbouring a 
“bad-debt” collecting centre in the shape of the HKSAR Courts.
The request, which we proposed, from the CFA to the Chief Execu-
tive, or simply, as the majority would prefer, taking para 5 of the 3rd Let-
ter as being perfectly clear in its meaning, would be enough to terminate 
this case, to decide it conclusively. Our aim in the Hong Kong Lawyer 
article was to avoid what now appears to have happened. Reviewing the 
British practice we said that “…the Foreign Offi ce was not entitled to 
bind English courts on matters of international law generally. Abstract 
views “on the law, even international law, were in no way conclusive”.4 
The CFI majority appear to be saying that a HKSAR Court must accept 
without question whatever the PRC says to be international law, on what-
ever matter, including the proposition that as a matter of international 
4 Ibid., at 47.
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law the role of a persistent objector is accepted – in fact a thoroughly 
contested issue among international lawyers. 
The majority opinion has gone much further than was necessary for 
a decision of the case and could expose the PRC on other occasions to 
legal argument in the HKSAR Courts for adopting an unusual inter-
pretation of a rule of international law or for once again appearing as a 
persistent objector, opposing the development of a new customary rule of 
international law, when it might be receiving the support of most states. 
The controversy which exists at present about the nature and extent of 
state immunity in international customary law is not an unusual feature 
of international law. It is quite normal that different states have differ-
ent interpretations of the nature and extent of rules of international law. 
It appears, on the face of it, that the majority opinion in this case is 
committing itself to the position that the PRC, through the OCMFA, 
may deliver an interpretation binding upon it, with respect to any and 
every rule of customary international law or even a multilateral treaty to 
which the HKSAR is party through the good offi ces of the PRC. It is true 
that, generally, the PRC does not favour compulsory or other third-party 
adjudication of disputes, although it does accept it in some cases, such 
as under the Statute of the World Trade Organization. However, for the 
CFA majority to treat the determination of the nature and extent of an 
international legal obligation as a declaration of a “fact of state underly-
ing foreign policy” is to offer a huge hostage to fortune, which it was the 
hope of Jones and myself to avoid through a simpler and more focused 
determination in accordance with the spirit of the above-quoted parts of 
para 5 of the 3rd Letter.
Recourse to International Law rather than Constitutional Law to 
Avoid Constitutional Confl ict and Resolve the Material Dispute 
Equitably
It appeared to Jones and myself obvious, after the decision of the Court 
of Appeal, that the DRC v FH Hemisphere case was building up into a 
constitutional confrontation along the lines of The Common Law versus 
the Sovereignty of the PRC. It was, arguably, a mistake on the part of both 
the majority and the Dissenting Opinions not to go directly to an inter-
pretation of the international law as Jones and I do in the concluding 
part of the Hong Kong Lawyer article.5 It would have been open to the 
majority opinion to have itself expressed the sentiments that are in the 
5 Ibid., at 48–49.
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3rd Letter, para 5. This would also have challenged Justices Bohkary and 
Mortimer to enter more closely into the merits of the particular case and 
revisit the decision of the majority in the Court of Appeal as to whether 
the transactions are sovereign or commercial. Instead, they put the main 
weight of their opinions onto a defense of the common law as an expres-
sion of the rule of law of which judges are the guardians. 
The issue would not simply be whether the original debts incurred 
by the Congo Government in the 1980s were sovereign or commercial, 
but whether all the facts underlying the transactions now – between the 
DRC, the PRC and individual banks and companies – taken together are 
sovereign in the sense of impacting upon the foreign policy goals of the 
PRC. This use of Art 19(3) appears appropriate as a safety-valve. 
The Role of Domestic Courts in Developing International Law
Of course there is also the general question of the role of domestic courts 
in developing international law. Most jurisdictions in the world are 
proud of the role which their domestic courts can play in this respect. 
They are thought to be contributing signifi cantly to the development of 
the rule of law at an international level.6 Indeed, it is now sometimes the 
position in England, that the Courts will not defer to the Executive on 
the issue whether the Crown’s conduct is compatible with the interna-
tional rule of law. Take for example the fairly recent cases of appeal from 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to the Court of Appeal 
in England. Here, the Court of Appeal has been willing repeatedly to 
question the soundness of treaties made by the United Kingdom with 
foreign countries, in this case Memoranda of Understanding between 
the United Kingdom and Libya, which, despite the fact that they are 
treaties, do not ensure the UK’s compliance with international law.7 The 
UK (Blair ) Government’s assertion that it was safe to return Libyan sus-
pect terrorists to Libya was not accepted, whatever high policy of state 
might encourage the United Kingdom, at that time, to cultivate good 
relations with Colonel Gaddafi . The treaty assurances given by Libya 
to the United Kingdom and accepted by the United Kingdom were not 
suffi cient for the Court of Appeal. Of course it is true that the Court of 
Appeal is able to rely upon the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporating 
the ECHR into UK law. Nevertheless, the immigration cases show that 
6 See for instance, J Nijman and A Nollkaemper, New Perspectives on the Divide between National 
and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
7 http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefi ngPaper/document/84.
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as a matter of legal policy it is not the case that common law judges must 
defer to the Executive simply because an issue before it concerns foreign 
relations. These foreign relations must now be judged in the light of the 
international rule of law, in these cases, international human rights law.
In future, to limit the damage of this case, the HK Courts should 
distinguish the law of sovereign immunity as a peculiar part of inter-
national law in allowing the courts to leave to the Executive the dis-
cretion to decide what comity requires in relations with other states, so 
that normally its courts of law remain the authoritative interpreters of 
international law. Comity is an issue separate from jurisdiction.8 This is a 
diffi cult and very much ex post facto argument to make. It might be pos-
sible to say that there is something especially sensitive about states using 
their own courts to sue one another as states. However, this should not 
be extended to claims of immunity of state offi cials in the courts of other 
states for acts which are contrary to international human rights, humani-
tarian or criminal law. As can be already seen from these speculations, 
damage limitation is not going to be easy.
8 I was stimulated to try to make this very much ex post facto distinction after perusing a draft case 
note by Cora Chan, Congo v FG Hemisphere: Implications on Hong Kong’s Judicial Autonomy.
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